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bound by the Convention. A number of domestic calls 
for criminalisation of posting of revenge porn have 
been replied with arguments for freedom of expres-
sion, worries that such means will contribute to a 
fragmented internet, and of a slippery slope of state 
interference. Further, as revenge porn touches upon 
the balancing between competing human rights, the 
possible result of outsourcing human rights assess-
ment to private entities becomes a point of discus-
sion in the paper.
Abstract:  With the enhanced distribution pos-
sibilities internet brings, online revenge porn has 
gained spotlight, as reports show that the act can 
cause serious consequences for victims. Research 
and reported cases have led to criticism of states lack 
of legal and executive means to protect victims, not 
least due to jurisdictional issues. Framing the mat-
ter within states responsibility to protect rights un-
der Article 8 of the ECHR, presents the issue of pos-
sible breach of human rights obligations of states 
A. Introduction
1 With the borderless nature of the internet1, the 
ambit of state interference regarding individuals 
and their actions has become ever more relevant, 
as technology has brought about challenges in 
respect to jurisdiction and enforcement of domestic 
legislation and human rights obligations. Actions 
that in the offline context are clear in a legal and 
societal sense have proven to be challenging in the 
online sphere. This poses questions concerning 
whether human rights obligations of states are being 
upheld in the online sphere, or if going online enacts 
a different standard for states to measure up to.
2 With respect to human rights, the role of states has 
been described as threefold: the obligation to respect, 
to protect and to fulfil human rights. The obligation 
1 Johnson, David R. and Post, David G. Law and Borders: The 
Rise of Law in Cyberspace. 48 Stanford Law Review 1367. 
1996.
to protect necessitates that individuals within the 
jurisdiction of a state should enjoy the protection 
of their rights. When, due to internet architecture a 
state cannot uphold its role as guarantor of human 
rights in the online sphere, what is the acceptable 
outcome from a legal perspective? Does the domestic 
legislation have to be put aside for the greater good 
of a free internet, or does the situation undermine 
human rights protection on a domestic level? The 
answers to these questions can vary, but this paper 
will examine the case of online revenge porn.
3 With the enhanced distribution possibilities the 
internet brings, online revenge porn has gained 
more attention as reports show that the act can 
cause serious consequences for victims. Research 
and reported cases have led to criticism of states and 
their lack of legal and executive means to protect 
victims, not least due to jurisdictional issues.2 
2 Citron, D.K. Hate Crimes in Cyberspace. 2014. Harvard 
University Press and Hill, R. “Cyber-misogyny. Should 
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Domestic calls for criminalization of the posting 
of revenge porn have been responded to with 
arguments for freedom of expression, worries that 
such means will contribute to a fragmented internet, 
and of a slippery slope of state interference online. 
Further, as revenge porn touches upon the balancing 
between competing human rights, the outsourcing 
of human rights assessment to private entities could 
become a point of discussion.
4 In order to address this issue, I will first introduce 
and define the term revenge porn, draw out the main 
aspects, and summarize a trend for criminalization 
of such acts. Next I will address aspects of the 
international human rights framework highlighting 
the current legal obligations for states bound by the 
European Convention on Human Rights.3 Thereafter 
I will look at jurisdictional issues that arise in cases of 
cross jurisdictional nature. Then I will briefly address 
the role of private entities such as social media 
platforms and hosting services before summarizing 
the main issues.
B. Revenge porn
I. Definition - or a lack thereof
5 The term revenge porn already poses a problem 
in terms of definition. Since introduced, the term 
has been used in public discourse as an acronym 
for unconsented distribution of sexual or intimate 
material, often with personal information attached, 
and intent to inflict harm or damage to the person 
depicted.4 The material can have been produced 
with or without the consent or knowledge of the 
person depicted, it´s sharing intended for personal 
use and not wider distribution, and with or without 
malicious intent of the distributor. This wide 
variation in circumstances has led to criticism of 
the term claiming it to be misleading,5 resulting 
in calls for a different terminology such as, “non-
consensual pornography” (NCP).6 The Oxford 
dictionaries definition: “revealing or sexually 
explicit images or videos of a person posted on 
the Internet, typically by a former sexual partner, 
revenge porn be regulated in Scotland and if so, how?” 
SCRIPTed, 2:12. 2015.
3 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms, as amended by Protocols Nos. 
11 and 14. CETS No. 5. Entry into force 3. September 1953. 
(ECHR).
4 Citron, D.K. Hate Crimes in Cyberspace. 2014. Harvard 
University Press. P. 17.
5 The Independent. Proudman, C.R. “Revenge porn: enough 
still isn’t being done to stop it” 2. July 2014.
6 Hill, R. “Cyber-misogyny. Should revenge porn be regulated 
in Scotland and if so, how?” SCRIPTed, 2:12. 2015. P. 118.
without the consent of the subject and in order to 
cause them distress or embarrassment”,7 shows that 
revenge is not always a key component of the act. 
However, cases show that the underlying intent to 
harm sometimes comes from an ex-lover scorned by 
the end of an intimate relationship with the person 
depicted.8 The definition also refers to revenge 
porn as a phenomenon of the internet. It could be 
argued that this is unprecise terminology. Most of 
the acts and expressions that the internet provides 
us access to have been a part of human society for 
a long time. They just took place in a narrower 
frame with a more limited geographical and mass 
distribution compared to the internet. In the 1970s, 
the US magazine Hustler dedicated a specific section 
in their publications to the publishing of photos sent 
in by its readers and depicted naked women along 
with personal information such as their names and 
addresses, and as cases showed, sometimes without 
the consent of the women depicted. The publishing 
of such photos in the magazine ceased in the 1980s 
after one of the women featured sued the magazine 
as she had not given her consent for publishing.9 This 
differs only from online revenge porn in terms of the 
platform the material is shared on, not the nature of 
the act, highlighting that not all components of the 
dictionary definition are precise.
6 Although the internet did not alter the concept, it 
has effected the amount. Material that could become 
revenge porn is increasingly digitally captured 
and stored on smartphones, now ubiquitous 
amongst teenagers,10 such devices have made video 
recording and photographing ourselves and others, 
with or without their knowledge, an everyday 
event. Young people only know a connected world 
where the internet serves as a general platform for 
information, entertainment and social interaction, 
and generally embrace evolving dynamics in social 
media platforms even before their parents or 
carers have heard of them. Today’s young will also 
become of age in a connected world, something that 
differs from today’s professionals, researchers and 
policymakers. Mistakes and misbehavior that have 
been a part of teenagers’ and young people’s growth 
from the dawn of time are no longer left as a memory 
of younger times. Today, the memories of teenagers 
are stored on computer clouds, on hard drives and 
7 <http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/
revenge-porn>. 
8 Hill, R. “Cyber-misogyny. Should revenge porn be regulated 
in Scotland and if so, how?” SCRIPTed, 2:12. 2015. P. 118.
9 Lajuan and Billy Wood vs. Hustler Magazine. 736 F 2d 1084 
(5th Cir.1984).
10 73% of teenagers (13-17 year old) in the United States 
of America have access to a smartphone according to 
the findings of Pew Research Center published in April. 
Accessible at: <http://www.pewinternet.org/2015/04/09/
teens-social-media-technology-2015/pi_2015-04-09_
teensandtech_06/>.
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uploaded to social media platforms accessible to 
everyone, anywhere, at any time.11 A recent study 
from the Internet Watch Foundation found that 
young people make and share self-generated sexual 
material12 from an even younger age than previous 
research showed. During the three month period of 
the study, 269 cases of material depicted children 
deemed in the age-group of 7-10.13  Almost 90% of 
the cases examined in the report detailed that the 
content had been forwarded or re-disseminated in 
cases where the child had shared the material with 
someone they trusted.14 Such dissemination entails 
the risk of the material becoming revenge porn.
7 The common denominator distinguishing revenge 
porn from other sexual material online is that the 
dissemination is not consented to by the person 
depicted. Due to the lack of consent, the material 
can be used to pressure the individuals depicted 
or cause them harm, as the publishing of revenge 
porn can have serious reputational and academic/
professional consequences for those portrayed.15 
Even if the material may have been shared with 
a partner as part of an intimate relationship, that 
does not mean that the material has been made 
available to the general public, nor does it imply 
consent that the material can be posted online.16 
Another common denominator is that due to the 
borderless nature of internet, domestic legislation 
and enforcement has struggled to fully grasp the 
phenomenon leaving those who fall victim to such 
acts feeling unprotected and let down by their 
domestic justice system. Indications suggest that 
revenge porn affects women disproportionately - or 
in 90% of the cases.17 In her 2014 book, Hate Crimes in 
Cyberspace, Citron compares views towards revenge 
porn and online harassment of women to dominant 
views on domestic violence and sexual harassment in 
the work place being a private matter that could not 
be regulated which existed up until the mid- to late 
11 See Mayer-Schönberger, V. delete. The virtue of Forgetting in 
the Digital Age. Princeton University Press. Princeton and 
Oxford. 2011. P. 85.
12 The IWF suggests that the term will be renewed and 
addressed as: “Nude or semi-nude images or videos produced 
by a young person of themselves engaging in erotic or sexual 
activity and intentionally shared by any electronic means”. 
Internet Watch Foundation in partnership with Microsoft. 
Emerging Patterns and Trends Report #1 Online-Produced Sexual 
Content. 10 March 2015. P. 1.
13 Ibid P. 12.
14 Ibid P. 3.
15 Keats Citron, D. Hate Crimes in Cyberspace. 2014. Harvard 
University Press. Cambridge, Massachusetts. P. 1-17.
16 Hill, R. “Cyber-misogyny. Should revenge porn be regulated 
in Scotland and if so, how?” SCRIPTed, 2:12. 2015. P. 123.
17 Ibid. P. 119. See also Keats Citron, D. Hate Crimes in Cyberspace. 
2014. Harvard University Press. Cambridge, Massachusetts. 
P.17.
1970s.18 Her claim that online harassment of women, 
including revenge porn, must be criminalized has 
gained traction on both sides of the Atlantic.19
II. A trend towards criminalization
8 On 14 October 2014, the UK Crown Prosecution 
Service issued guidelines on how to prosecute cases 
of revenge porn. It stipulated that such acts could fall 
within the scope of existing legislation even if there 
was not a specific act criminalizing revenge porn.20 
The same applied in many European countries, 
where the posting of revenge porn could constitute 
a breach of civil law, and in certain cases lead to 
criminal charges such as, harassment, decency and 
defamation, without specific reference to revenge 
porn. Out of 149 cases on file from eight police 
precincts in England and Wales during the time of 
the issuance of the guidelines until April 2015 when 
revenge porn was criminalized in the UK, six cases 
resulted in charges or police caution.21
9 In March 2015 a District Court in Iceland convicted 
the 18 year old ex-boyfriend of a 17 year old girl for 
publishing naked photos of the girl on his Facebook 
page for a few minutes before deleting them from the 
social media platform. The girl had taken the photos 
in question herself and sent them to the defendant 
during their relationship. He confessed to the act and 
was sentenced to 60 days suspended imprisonment, 
for a violation of the decency and defamation clauses 
of the General Penal Code,22 causing her harm and 
distress under the Tort Act,23 and found in violation 
of the Child Protection Act.24 He was ordered to pay 
18 Citron, D.K. Hate Crimes in Cyberspace. P. 95.
19 Ibid. P. 142 – 143.
20 The guidelines were published 14 October 2014 and are 
accessible at: Crown Prosecution Service (2015) < http://
www.cps.gov.uk/legal/a_to_c/communications_sent_via_
social_media/>.
21 The Daily Mail. Revenge porn laws come to force. 13. April 2015.
22 The defendant was found in breach of Articles 209. And 
233.b. of the General Penal Code No. 19/2940. Article 209 
reads: “Any person who, through lewd conduct, offends 
people’s sense of decency or causes a public scandal, shall be 
imprisoned for up to 4 years, or [up to 6 months]1) or fined 
if the offence is minor.” Article 233.b. reads: “Anyone who 
insults or denigrates his or her spouse or ex-spouse, child or 
other closely-related person, the offence being considered 
as constituting serious defamation, shall be imprisoned for 
up to two years.”
23 Article 26, paragraph 1of the Tort Act No. 50/1993 reads: 
“A party who a) by intention or by gross negligence, 
causes personal injury, or b) is responsible for an unlawful, 
malicious action directed against the freedom, peace, 
honour or person of another individual may be ordered to 
pay the injured party damages for loss of amenities of life.”
24 Article 99, paragraph 3 of the Child Protection Act No. 
80/2002 reads: “Any person who subjects a child to 
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the victim damages and to bear all costs for the court 
proceedings.25 On 10 December 2015, the Icelandic 
Supreme Court upheld the judgement.26 A month 
later, in January 2016, a bill was re-introduced to the 
Icelandic parliament proposing a legal amendment to 
the General Penal Code criminalizing revenge porn. 
The commentary to the draft bill states that it draws 
on the UK Criminal Justice and Courts Law enacted 
in April 2015.27 As laid out in the commentary to the 
draft bill, it’s presentation to parliament is rooted 
in the notion that such serious attacks on a person’s 
personal integrity, protected under human rights, 
could not be overlooked by the criminal legislation, 
and despite the current legislation being applicable, 
further legislative actions were needed in order to 
provide victims of revenge porn sufficient protection 
to personal integrity and privacy as enshrined in the 
ECHR.28
10 This view corresponds with the picture Citron 
unveils concerning the application of a legal 
framework and remedies for victims of revenge 
porn in the United States of America.29 The author 
claims that the current civil law remedies under 
tort and the copyright framework do not provide 
sufficient protection for individuals, as the financial 
cost of civil suits makes them an unrealistic choice 
for some.30 Citron additionally claims that current 
criminal legal remedies will not protect victims of 
revenge porn sufficiently, as even in cases where 
criminal charges could be pursued against the 
distributor of the material, the lack of police capacity 
and outdated views towards online activity resulted 
in cases not being processed properly through the US 
justice system.31 She argues that in order for states 
to protect victims of revenge porn, civil rights law 
should be amended to penalize online harassers.32 
Citron, alongside Professor Mary Ann Franks, has 
also drawn on social condemnation arguments in 
favor of criminalization of revenge porn33 and has 
emphasized that invasion of privacy amounting to 
criminal liability is not a new notion. In their article 
aggressive, abusive or indecent behaviour or hurts or 
insults him/her is liable to fines or imprisonment for up to 
two years.”
25 The Eastland District Court. Case No. S-36/2014. 27 March 
2015.
26 The Icelandic Supreme Court. Case No. 312/2015. 10. 
December 2015.
27 The draft bill is accessible only in Icelandic at the website 
of the Icelandic Parliament: <http://www.althingi.is/
altext/145/s/0011.html>.
28 Ibid.
29 U.S.
30 Keats Citron, D. Hate Crimes in Cyberspace. 2014. Harvard 
University Press. Cambridge, Massachusetts. P. 122.
31 Ibid. P. 123.
32 Ibid. P. 142.
33 Citron, D.K. and Franks, M.A. Criminalizing Revenge Porn. 
2014. 49 Wake Forest Law Review 349.
Revenge Porn Should be Criminalized, Citron and Franks 
draw on Warren and Brandeis argument published 
in 1890 stating “[i]t would doubtless be desirable 
that the privacy of the individual should receive the 
added protection of the criminal law.”34
11 A critique on the legal and executive frameworks 
in respect to revenge porn has gained global media 
attention with a string of high profile cases,35 reports 
of justice systems failing to protect victims of 
revenge porn, and the formation of advocacy groups 
and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) that 
have pushed for the criminalization of revenge porn 
both in the US and in European countries.36 These 
efforts have been somewhat successful, resulting 
in legal amendments in 26 US states, Israel37 and a 
number of European countries, notably England and 
Wales in April 2015.38 Draft bills have been presented 
recently to the Scottish39 and Icelandic40 parliaments 
respectively to criminalize the posting of revenge 
porn, and preparatory research work has taken place 
in Sweden41.
12 The first specific criminal legislation on revenge 
porn was passed in the US State of New Jersey in 
34 Ibid. P. 346.
35 See for example the case of Tulisa Contostavlos: The 
Telegraph. Radhika Sanghani, R. “Tulisa sex tape hell. Trolls 
aren´t usually to blame for revenge porn, our loved ones are.” 29. 
July 2014, and the case of Jennifer Lawrence Vanity Fair. 
“Jennifer Lawrence calls Photo Hacking a Sex Crime.” November 
2014.
36 To name some: End Revenge Porn <http://www.
endrevengeporn.org/>, Civil Rights Initiative <http://www.
cybercivilrights.org/> and Stop Revenge Porn Scotland 
<https://stoprevengepornscotland.wordpress.com/>.
37 Posting revenge porn constitutes to a breach of the 
Prevention of Sexual Harassment Act as amended in 2015. It 
classifies posting of revenge porn as sexual harassment and 
entails that the offender will be registered as a sex offender. 
See further analysis in Hill, R. “Cyber-misogyny. Should 
revenge porn be regulated in Scotland and if so, how?” 
SCRIPTed, 2:12. 2015. P. 136=137.
38 Article 33 of the Criminal Justice and Courts Act as amended 
of April 2015 states the disclosure of a private sexual 
photograph or film is an offence if the disclosure is made 
without the consent of an individual who appears in the 
photograph or film, and with the intention of causing that 
individual distress. The act is punishable with up to two 
years imprisonment. <http://www.legislation.gov.uk/
ukpga/2015/2/section/33/enacted>.
39 The Abusive Behaviour and Sexual Harm (Scotland) 
Bill was introduced in the Parliament on 8 October 
2015. - See more at: <http://www.scottish.parliament.
uk/parliamentarybusiness/CurrentCommittees/93068.
aspx#sthash.LrQvogRT.dpuf>.
40 An amendment bill to the General Penal Code making the 
posting of revenge porn criminal was re-introduced to the 
Parliament on 10 September 2015. Available in Icelandic at: 
<http://www.althingi.is/thingstorf/thingmalalistar-eftir-
thingum/ferill/?ltg=145&mnr=11>.
41 Statens Offentliga Utredningar. Integritet och straffskydd. 
Stockholm. SOU 2016:7. (In Swedish).
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2003.42 Since then, 25 more States in the US have 
enacted legal reforms criminalizing the publishing 
of revenge porn. In most cases the perpetrator has 
to have had an intent to inflict harm and should 
have known that publishing the material was non-
consensual.43 This is the case in California, which is 
a relevant judicial precinct as many of social media 
sharing platforms operate under California law.44 The 
legal amendments made to the UK Criminal Justice 
and Courts Law enacted in April 2015 are similar as 
the provision demands that the person was acting 
in bad faith and had the intention to inflict harm to 
the individual exposed.45 Following the amendment46 
in April 2015, UK police authorities saw 200 cases of 
revenge porn reported from England and Wales.47
13 The NGO ‘End Revenge Porn’ states that the revenge 
porn legislation put in place in the U.S. state of 
Illinois provides the best protection for individuals 
harmed by revenge porn and at the same time 
provides a balanced approach to the freedom of 
expression protected by the First Amendment to the 
US Constitution.48 In particular it is emphasized that 
42 Keats Citron, D. Hate Crimes in Cyberspace. 2014. Harvard 
University Press. Cambridge, Massachusetts. The legal text 
is accessible at: <http://law.onecle.com/new-jersey/2c-
the-new-jersey-code-of-criminal-justice/14-9.html>.
43 Overview of revenge porn legal acts from the US is available 
at the website of the NGO End Revenge Porn accessible at: 
<http://www.endrevengeporn.org/revenge-porn-laws/>. 
Similar conditions are put up in a draft legislation currently 
discussed in the Icelandic parliament accessible here only 
in Icelandic: <http://www.althingi.is/altext/145/s/0011.
html>.
44 Section 647, Article 4(a) of the California Penal Code states: 
“Any person who intentionally distributes the image of 
the intimate body part or parts of another identifiable 
person, or an image of the person depicted engaged in an 
act of sexual intercourse, sodomy, oral copulation, sexual 
penetration, or an image of masturbation by the person 
depicted or in which the person depicted participates, under 
circumstances in which the persons agree or understand 
that the image shall remain private, the person distributing 
the image knows or should know that distribution of the 
image will cause serious emotional distress, and the person 
depicted suffers that distress.” The legislation is accessible 
at: <http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/cgi-bin/displaycode?sectio
n=pen&group=00001-01000&file=639-653.2>.
45 An updated list of states with such legislation in the 
US as of 1. October 2015 is accessible at: <http://www.
endrevengeporn.org/revenge-porn-laws/>.
46 Article 33 of the Criminal Justice and Courts Act states 
the disclosure of a private sexual photograph or film is an 
offence if the disclosure is made without the consent of an 
individual who appears in the photograph or film, and with 
the intention of causing that individual distress. The act is 
punishable with up to two years imprisonment. <http://
www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2015/2/section/33/
enacted>.
47 The Guardian. Revenge porn cases increase considerably, police 
figures reveal. 16 July 2015.
48 A graphic description of the legislation is accessible at 
the NGO´s website: <http://www.endrevengeporn.org/
anatomy-effective-revenge-porn-law/>.
the legislation not only applies to the person that 
posts the material initially, but also to subsequent 
distributors that should have known the material 
was not posted with the consent of the individual 
portrayed. The aim is to try and limit the distribution 
of the harmful material.
C. The human rights framework
14 The international framework for the promotion 
and protection of human rights takes place in 
many contexts. The overarching role of the United 
Nations (UN) has a global effect, with what has been 
described as the international bill of rights49 and a 
system of promotion and protection of human rights 
under the ambit of the UN Human Rights Council 
while stretching to every aspect of the UN system.50 
Further, regional cooperation in the field of human 
rights has become a strong part of the drive towards 
strengthening of human rights in domestic legal 
contexts. In wider Europe, the cooperation within 
the Council of Europe and the development of the 
Convention system51 following the disastrous events 
of the World War in the mid-20th Century. Similar 
systems were set up on a regional basis in other parts 
of the world.52
I. Responsibility to protect
15 It is generally undisputed that states are the main 
guarantors of human rights within their borders.53 
Their obligations have been described as threefold: 
the obligations to respect; to protect; and to fulfil 
49 The term refers to three core documents: the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, adopted by General Assembly 
resolution 217 A (III) of 10 December 1948, The International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights were 
adopted by the General Assembly by its resolution 2200 A 
(XXI) of 16 December 1966 and the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights adopted by General 
Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 1966.
50 Extensive literature exists on the UN Human Rights 
system. See the official webpage for the Office of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights: <http://www.ohchr.org/
EN/Pages/Home.aspx>.
51 Extensive literature exists on the European 
Convention System. See the official webpage for the 
Convention at: <http://www.echr.coe.int/Pages/home.
aspx?p=basictexts&c=#n1359128122487_pointer>.
52 See for example Nmehielle, V.O. The African Human Rights 
System: Its Laws, Practice, and Institutions. 2001. Martinus 
Nijhoff. The Hague/London/New York.
53 Doswald-Beck, L. Human Rights in Times of Conflict and 
Terrorism. 2011. Oxford University Press. Oxford. P. 30. 
Steiner, H.J., Alston, P, Goodman, R. International Human 
Rights in Context. Law, Politics, Moral. Text and Materials. 3rd 
Edition. 2008. Oxford University Press. Oxford. P. 1087.
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human rights.54 The responsibility to protect55 has 
been described as a duty to protect individuals from 
human rights violations, entailing a responsibility to 
proactively prevent individuals from within their 
jurisdiction to not suffer human rights violations 
by third parties, be that individuals, groups or 
legal persons.56 This includes ensuring preventive 
measures in place in order for threats of violation of 
rights of individuals not to materialize. An example 
of this is providing for a functioning police force 
that has balanced investigative powers. Under the 
classification, state responsibility also extends to 
situations where safeguards fail, and violations are 
caused by non-state actors, effectively necessitating 
that states shall ensure effective remedies for 
those who are violated against.57 This is further 
stipulated through various regional58 human rights 
instruments.
16 In the Council of Europe’s 2014 Recommendation 
Guide to human rights for internet users,59 it is emphasized 
that states have to ensure that individuals can enjoy 
their rights effectively and that the obligations of 
states to respect, protect and promote human rights 
“include the oversight of private companies.”60 The 
Council of Europe’s 2001 Cybercrime Convention61 
and recent human rights instruments, such as the 
Lanzarote Convention on the Protection of Children 
54 De Schutter, O. International Human Rights Law. Cases, 
Materials, Commentary. 2nd edition. 2014. Cambridge University 
Press. Cambridge. P. 280 – 281.
55 This does not refer to the idea of ‘Responsibility to Protect’ 
that deals with state and international community 
responsibility to avert atrocities, but to the doctrinal 
meaning of the obligation to protect under human rights 
obligations of states. See further: Mégret, F. Nature of 
obligations. International Human Rights Law. Second Edition. 
Edited by Daniel Moeckli, Sangeeta Shah and Sandesh 
Sivakumaran. 2014. Oxford University Press. Oxford. P. 102.
56 Ibid.
57 De Schutter, O. International Human Rights Law. Cases, 
Materials, Commentary. 2nd edition. 2014. Cambridge University 
Press. Cambridge. P. 427.
58 See European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms, as amended by Protocols Nos. 
11 and 14. CETS No. 5. Entry into force 3. September 1953. 
Article 13 Right to an effective remedy “Everyone whose rights 
and freedoms as set forth in this Convention are violated 
shall have an effective remedy before a national authority 
notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by 
persons acting in an official capacity.”
59 Recommendation CM/Rec(2014)6 of the Committee of 
Ministers to member States adopted on 16. April 2014.
60 Ibid. Article 2.
61 Cybercrime Convention. CETS No.185. Entry into force 1 
July 2004. Also referred to as the Budapest Convention. The 
Convention was the first international treaty on crimes 
committed via the Internet and other computer networks, 
dealing particularly with infringements of copyright, 
computer-related fraud, child pornography and violations 
of network security. It also contains a series of powers and 
procedures such as the search of computer networks and 
interception.
against Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse62 
explicitly address State obligations to tackle online 
activity through legislation and “other effective 
means”.
17 In the case of K.U. v. Finland of 2 December 2009 
(Application No. 2872/02), the European Court of 
Human Rights was presented with the case of a child 
whose information was posted by an anonymous 
person to a dating website insinuating that the child 
was interested in sexual relations with a grown man. 
No effective means were in place in order for the 
police to obtain information from relevant Internet 
Service Providers as to who posted the information, 
resulting in no one being found responsible for the 
harm caused to the child. In its findings the Court 
stated (Para. 42) that:
“…although the object of Article 8 is essentially to protect 
the individual against arbitrary interference by the public 
authorities, it does not merely compel the State to abstain 
from such interference: in addition to this primarily negative 
undertaking, there may be positive obligations inherent in an 
effective respect for private or family life…”  and that “…these 
obligations may involve the adoption of measures designed 
to secure respect for private life even in the sphere of the 
relations of individuals between themselves…” (Para. 43).
18 The Court further noted that there were “difficulties 
involved in policing modern societies”, but a positive 
burden on the state to take measures in order to 
protect the applicants rights to privacy under Article 
8 must be “interpreted in a way which does not 
impose an impossible or disproportionate burden 
on the authorities or, as in this case, the legislator…” 
while at the same time ensuring that “powers to 
control, prevent and investigate crime are exercised 
in a manner which fully respects the due process and 
other guarantees which legitimately place restraints 
on criminal investigations and bringing offenders to 
justice […]”63
19 Before ruling in favor of the applicant in the case, 
the Court noted a general principle (Para. 49) stating 
that:
“Although freedom of expression and confidentiality of 
communications are primary considerations and users 
of telecommunications and Internet services must have a 
guarantee that their own privacy and freedom of expression 
will be respected, such guarantee cannot be absolute and 
must yield on occasion to other legitimate imperatives, such 
as the prevention of disorder or crime or the protection of the 
rights and freedoms of others. […] [I]t is nonetheless the task 
62 Council of Europe Convention on the Protection of Children 
against Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse. CETS No. 
201. Entry into force 1 July 2010. Also referred to as the 
Lanzarote Convention.
63 K.U. v. Finland of 2 December 2009 (Application No. 2872/02). 
Excerpts from Para. 47 and 48.
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of the legislator to provide the framework for reconciling the 
various claims which compete for protection in this context 
…”
20 The Court’s findings in the case highlight the 
competing rights that come into play when 
examining revenge porn in the context of human 
rights – the freedom of expression on one hand, and 
the rights to privacy and personal integrity on the 
other.
II. Does the freedom of expression 
include the freedom to 
distribute harmful content?
21 Freedom of expression is closely linked to the 
fundamental elements of democracy and democratic 
principles.64 The scope of state interferences on 
actions of individuals and legal persons on the 
internet has revolved around the core issue of 
freedom of expression. One of the main arguments 
against states setting up legal safeguards as described 
in Section A.II., is that categorical restrictions on 
the freedom of expression will undermine the free 
nature of the internet leading to its fragmentation 
and, subsequently, collapse. The general argument 
goes that, although well intentioned, it could prove 
to be a slippery slope towards censorship on the 
internet.65 Some governments have tried means 
such as internet censorship to create “national” 
intranets in line with national borders to maintain 
their legal and sovereign powers online as well as 
offline.66 This has proved challenging in practice 
but has not dissuaded states from pursuing such 
initiatives on a domestic and international level.67 
That does not alter the scope of obligation of states, 
as the UN Human Rights Council and the Council 
64 Ovey, C., and White, R.C.A. Jacobs and White European 
Convention on Human Rights. 3rd Edition. 2002. Oxford 
University Press. Oxford. P. 279.
65 See for example the Internet Governance Principles 
accepted at the Netmundial Conference in Brazil 2014 
accessible at: <http://content.netmundial.br/contribution/
internet-governance-principles/176>.
66 This includes restrictive means such as filtering and blocking. 
Noteworthy cases from the European Court on Human 
Rights such as Ahmet Yıldırım v. Turkey of 18. December 2012 
(Application No. 3111/10) where a governmental restriction 
on internet access due to content that the applicant had 
uploaded to the internet was unlawful and therefor did not 
meet the standards of protection awarded by article 10 of 
the Convention.
67 The International Telecommunications Union met in Cairo 
in 2012 with the intention to update several of its treaties. 
A draft treaty intended to ensure stronger governmental 
influence in the regulation of internet infrastructure in 
the name of better upholding national legislation was 
not approved. The Guardian. Arthur, C. “Internet remains 
unregulated after UN Treaty Block.” 14. December 2012.
of Europe´s Committee of Ministers68 have both 
specifically declared that human rights shall apply 
equally online and offline.69
22 The core human rights document of the United 
Nations is the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights adopted in 1948.70 Article 19 of the declaration 
stipulates that the freedom of opinion and 
expression applies regardless of the medium used 
and irrespective of frontiers. The importance of the 
right is further stated in Article 19 of the subsequent 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
where conditions for interference with the freedom 
of expression are laid out.71 Furthermore, according 
to Article 20, states are obliged to restrict expression 
that can threaten peace and security.72
23 Regional cooperation and conventions in the 
field provide additional stakes in the safeguards 
of the competing rights. States that are subject 
to the European Convention System can rely on the 
Convention text73 but also extensive case law from the 
Strasbourg Court for guidance in the balancing act 
between freedom of expression and the factors that 
can be limiting to it, such as the rights of others and 
68 Recommendation CM/Rec(2014)6 of the Committee of 
Ministers to member States adopted on 16. April 2014.
69 The promotion, protection and enjoyment of human rights 
on the Internet. A/HRC/20/L.13.
70 Adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in Paris 
on 10 December 1948. Res. 217 A.
71 Article 19 of the ICCPR reads: 1) Everyone shall have the 
right to hold opinions without interference. 2) Everyone 
shall have the right to freedom of expression: this right shall 
include freedom to seek, receive and impart information 
and ideas of all kids, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in 
writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other 
media of his choice. 3) The exercise of the rights provided 
for in paragraph 2 of this article carries with it special duties 
and responsibilities. It may therefore be subject to certain 
restrictions, but these shall only be such as provided by law 
or necessary: a) For respect of the rights or reputation of 
others: b) For the protection of national security or of public 
order (ordre public), or of public health or morals.
72 Article 20 of the ICCPR reads: 1) Any propaganda for war 
shall be prohibited by law. 2) Any advocacy of national, 
racial or religious violence shall be prohibited by law.
73 Article10 of the ECHR provides: (1) Everyone has the right 
to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom 
to hold opinions and to receive and impart information 
and ideas without interference by public authority and 
regardless of frontiers. This Article shall not prevent States 
from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or 
cinema enterprises. (2) The exercise of these freedoms, since 
it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to 
such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are 
prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, 
in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or 
public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for 
the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the 
reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure 
of information received in confidence, or for maintaining 
the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.
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societal interests.74 The Court has established that 
the protection provided to the freedom of expression 
under Article 10 does not apply to all expression as 
the Court has found that expressions that go against 
the fundamental values of the Convention will not 
be tested before the Court and will be deemed under 
the scope of Article 17, prohibiting the misuse of the 
Convention.75 Nevertheless the Court has stated that 
Article 10 protects not only “‘information’ or ‘ideas’ 
that are favorably received or regarded as inoffensive 
or as a matter of indifference, but also to those that 
offend, shock or disturb the State or any sector of 
the population.”76 Thus, offensive expression can 
enjoy the protection of the Convention under Article 
10, although it may be subject to limitations under 
paragraph 2, such as in the interests of the rights of 
others. Rights of others includes among other things 
the rights protected under Article 8. The borders 
between these rights have been tested in a number 
of cases regarding defamation and media freedom of 
expression. In the case RUSU v. Romania of 8 March 
2016 (Application No. 25721/04) the Court stated:
24 “[…] Lastly, in cases which require the right to 
respect for private life to be balanced against the 
right to freedom of expression, the Court considers 
that the outcome of the application should not, in 
theory, vary according to whether it has been lodged 
with the Court under Article 8 of the Convention 
by the person who was the subject of the news 
report, or under Article 10 by the publisher. Indeed, 
as a matter of principle these rights deserve equal 
respect […]” (Para. 24).
25 From the above it could be established that in states 
bound by the ECHR, freedom of expression does not 
exist without limitations neither online nor offline. 
This indicates that there exists no such right as to 
exercise freedom of expression without any regard 
to a wider context such as the rights of others. John 
74 An overview of relevant case law regarding hate speech is 
accessible at: <http://echr.coe.int/Documents/FS_Hate_
speech_ENG.pdf>.
75 “[T]here is no doubt that any remark directed against the 
Convention’s underlying values would be removed from 
the protection of Article 10 [freedom of expression] by 
Article 17 [prohibition of abuse of rights]” Seurot v. France. 
Decision on the admissibility of 18 May 2004. (Application 
No. 57383/00).
76 In the Case Handyside v. United Kingdom of 7 December 
1976 (Application no. 5493/72) the ECHR set out ground 
principles for the scope of Article 10 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights stating that: “Freedom of 
expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of 
[a democratic] society, one of the basic conditions for its 
progress and for the development of every man. Subject 
to paragraph 2 of Article 10 [of the European Convention 
on Human Rights], it is applicable not only to ‘information’ 
or ‘ideas’ that are favourably received or regarded as 
inoffensive or as a matter of indifference, but also to those 
that offend, shock or disturb the State or any sector of the 
population.”
Stuart Mill argued: “[…] even opinions lose their 
immunity, when the circumstances in which they 
are expressed are such as to constitute […] a positive 
instigation to some mischievous act.”77 Although 
written in another time, the principle seems to still 
apply. The dissemination of expression such as a 
photo depicting a naked person can be a perfectly 
valid action that deserves the full protection of the 
freedom of expression. But the context that such 
dissemination takes place in is of utmost importance 
when examined from a human rights perspective. 
In the context of revenge porn, the rights of others 
(the person depicted) weighs heavily against the 
disseminator’s freedom of expression.
III. Does criminalization 
meet the human rights 
obligations of states?
26 The role of the state in a democratic society is a topic 
of endless discussion and the subject of many more 
disciplines than law. The digital dimension does 
not simplify the matter. Law provides only a part of 
the picture. Framed in national constitutions and 
described in international and domestic legislation, 
the solutions legislation provides is bound by the 
notion of the nation state and both its application 
and enforcement limited to state jurisdictions. 
Human rights obligations provide principles for 
the states, but their application depends on various 
factors such as political stability and culture. States’ 
varied compliance of fundamental values further 
add to the lack of coherence. This colorful palette 
framed within the human rights framework raises 
the question of how much is enough for states to do 
in order to uphold their responsibility to protect?
27 The measurement for success in terms of effective 
human rights protection has usually ensued in 
application or enforcement of legislation. As 
discussed above, reports indicate that very few cases 
have been decided on the basis of the recent revenge 
porn legislation in the UK, so the effectiveness of the 
legislation is yet to be determined. Experience from 
the US shows that although some legal safeguards 
are in place, they may not be effective.78 In 74% of 
Web Index countries, the Web Foundation found 
that domestic justice systems are failing to take 
appropriate actions for violence against women 
online - revenge porn being listed as an example of 
such violence.79 A recent study on crimes committed 
77 Mill, J.S. On liberty and Other Essays. 1991. Oxford University 
Press. Oxford. P. 56.
78 Citron, D.K. Hate Crimes in Cyberspace. 2014. Harvard 
University Press. Cambridge, Massachusetts. P. 105 and 141.
79 The Broadband Commission for Digital Development. Cyber 
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via the internet by The Swedish National Council for 
Crime Prevention states that 96% of cases reported 
to the police will not go further within the justice 
system.80 Out of the cases that the police examined 
but were found to have insufficient evidence 
to proceed, the main reason was that technical 
information was lacking to establish who the 
perpetrator was. According to the police, the main 
reason was that the social media and ISPs holding 
the information were not willing to provide the 
police with the information despite such evidence 
being a necessary component of the investigation. 
Police expressed that the biggest problem was 
when dealing with companies outside of Swedish 
jurisdiction; in particular companies that were under 
US jurisdiction.81 The Icelandic police claims that it 
faces the same problem in dealing with sites set up to 
share naked photos of women and girls, and despite 
using the international legal assistance scheme, they 
have run into the same barriers as their Swedish 
counterparts. An Icelandic Police officer summed 
up the situation stating: “cases like these are difficult 
for the police, in particular when the websites are 
foreign. We cannot control the internet.”82
D. Jurisdictional issues
28 The global nature of the internet does not abide to 
the same borders as states, adding a new dimension 
to the jurisdiction of states. 83 The internet is not 
wholly bound by nations, cultures, or geo-borders, 
but is in no way unaffected by those factors. The 
physical and wireless infrastructure in the transport 
layer of the internet is connected within and across 
borders of nation states, running on components 
that have been referred to as “code”.84 Code is such 
an important factor in the running of the internet, 
that it has famously been stated that code is law. 85 
A fundamental difference between the two is that 
Violence against Women and Girls. A World-Wide Wake up call. 
2015. P. 39.
80 Polisanmälda brott hot och kränkningar mot enskilda personer via 
internet. Rapport 2015:6. The study is accessible in Swedish 
with an English summary via the Council´s website at: 
<https://bra.se/5.5e2a4a6b14ab166759983d.html#>.
81 Ibid. P. 90.
82 Visir.is. “Lögreglan máttlaus gagnvart nektarmyndum á 
netinu” (“Police powerless facing naked photos online”). 8. 
September 2014. Friðrik Smári Björgvinsson, Police Officer. 
The original statement is in Icelandic „Svona mál eru erfið 
fyrir lögregluna, sérstaklega þegar um erlendar síður er að 
ræða. Við getum ekki stjórnað internetinu”.
83 Schultz, T, “Carving up the internet”, The European Journal 
of International Law, vol. 19, no. 4, 2008, pp. 799–839.
84 Brown, I. and Marsden, C. Regulating Code. Good governance 
and better regulation in the information age. 2013. MIT Press. 
London, England and Cambridge, Massachusetts.
85 Lessig, L. Code 2.0. 2006. Basic Books. New York. P. 5.
law applies only within a prescribed and clearly 
authorized jurisdiction, while code applies wherever 
it works. In light of the fact that the internet serves 
everyone that can access it, the application of law 
that is bound by the jurisdiction of nation states will 
barely be uniform – even if it has its basis in human 
rights that are intended to apply universally.
29 Scholars have argued that human rights and 
sovereignty cannot be fully compatible, as the 
international order of human rights challenges 
the principle of sovereignty.86 Globalization poses 
challenges to the independent function of the state, 
and presents challenges to traditional legal theory, 
for instance “black box theories”, that treat nation 
states, societies, legal systems, and legal orders 
as closed, impervious entities that can be studied 
in isolation.87 The same theory could be applied 
to the internet, which is an advanced example of 
globalization of information as well as services.88 
This has resulted in challenges to the universal 
application of human rights that are not least bound 
to the issue of state sovereignty, posing the question: 
can states uphold their human rights obligations in 
the same capacity online and offline?89 Furthermore, 
in light of the aforementioned principle of the 
responsibility to protect; to what extent can an 
individual expect that the state will fulfil and enforce 
a legal framework that abides by tighter boundaries 
than in cyberspace?
30 The scope of application is a key component of human 
rights instruments, just as in most conventions 
and contracts intended to have a bearing for the 
contracting parties. Most treaties specify that they 
apply within the scope of the contracting parties’ 
jurisdiction.90 Article 1 of the ECHR states that: “The 
High Contracting Parties shall secure to everyone 
within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms 
defined in Section I of this Convention”. By case 
law the Court has established that jurisdiction does 
not only mean within the physical or geographical 
borders of a state,91 although it has been claimed that 
86 Duzinas, C. The End of Human Rights: Critical Legal Thought 
at the Turn of the Century. 2000. Hart Publishing. Oxford. P. 
374 and Dickinson, R. Universal human rights: a challenge too 
far. Examining Critical Perspectives on Human Rights. Edited by 
Dickinson, R., Katselli, E., Murray, C., and Pedersen, O.W. 
2012. Cambridge University Press. New York. P. 175.
87 Ibid. P. 177 and Twining, W. Globalisation and Legal Theory. 
2000. London. Butterworths. P. 252.
88 Marsden, C.T. Information and communications technologies, 
globalisation, and regulation. In: Regulating the Global 
Information Society. Edited by Marsden, C.T. 2000. Routledge. 
London/New York. P. 2.
89 The question does not entail that states uphold their human 
rights obligations to the full extent offline.
90 This is not without exemption. The UN Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights does not contain a 
clause on jurisdiction.
91 See the ECHR factsheet on extra-territorial jurisdiction 
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the Court has been inconsistent in the application 
of the article.92
31 The UN International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights refers to its application as “within 
its territory” as well as “subject to its jurisdiction”. 
In the Lopez Burgos v. Uruguay case the Human Rights 
Committee formed a view stating that “it would be 
unconscionable to so interpret the responsibility 
under the Article 2 of the Covenant as to permit a 
State party to perpetrate violations of the Covenant 
on the territory of another State, which violations 
it could not perpetrate on its own territory.”93 The 
same views are expressed in the International Court 
of Justice advisory opinion on the Palestinian Wall, 
noting that although jurisdiction is “primarily 
territorial, it may sometimes be exercised outside 
the national territory”.94
32 Within the limits of the sovereignty principle, a 
state carries the trias politica powers95 entailing a 
multifaceted role of states online as well as offline. It 
is generally undisputed that states have a legitimate 
claim to a role on the internet. The extent and 
essence of this role on the other hand is still subject 
to ongoing discourse.96
33 Parts of the internet are regulated in different 
capacities but no holistic regulation is in place. Parts 
of the infrastructure, the information highway, are 
regulated under telecommunications legislation 
while companies and entities whose operation 
is essential to the functioning of the internet are 
regulated through general legislation on companies 
and competition on a domestic and regional level. 
With the single market, the EU has taken steps 
towards a harmonized European regulation affecting 
both infrastructure, business and content, and 
recent judicial development indicates a more direct 
application of current legal frameworks to influence 
online services.97 Recent efforts signal an increase in 
accessible at: <http://echr.coe.int/Documents/FS_Extra-
territorial_jurisdiction_ENG.pdf>.
92 Milanovic, M. Applicability of the ECHR to British soldiers in Iraq. 
Cambridge Law Journal. Volume 70. Issue 1. 2011. P. 7-11.
93 HRCte, Lopez Burgos v. Uruguay Com 52/1979, Views, 29 
July 1981, paragraph 12.3.
94 Doswald-Beck, L. Human Rights in Times of Conflict and 
Terrorism. 2011. Oxford University Press. Oxford. P. 11.
95 The three branches of government; legislature, executive 
and judiciary.
96 Brown, I. and Marsden, C. Regulating Code. Good governance 
and better regulation in the information age. 2013. MIT Press. 
London, England and Cambridge, Massachusetts. P. 2-4.
97 The European Court of Justice is a key player in this 
development with its decision in the Google vs. Spain (Case 
C-131/12) verdict entailing the right to be forgotten and the 
recent advisory opinion in the so called Safe Harbour case 
(Case C-362/14) effectively stating that the data sharing 
practices current online operations are based on are not 
compliant with the EU Charter on Fundamental Rights and 
the role of companies such as media outlets and social 
media platforms in the online context.98 In light of 
the essential part such companies play in order for 
states to be able to live up to their human rights 
obligations as described earlier, does the internet 
infrastructure entail that in cases as sensitive as 
revenge porn, that human rights protection of 
individuals in European countries lie in the hands 
of US technology companies?
E. The role of private entities
34 Private entities are of significant importance for 
the functioning of the internet. Internet service 
providers, the backbone of the internet, are entities 
that are largely privately owned on both sides of 
the Atlantic, although internet infrastructure, such 
as broadband deployment has across the ‘OECD’ 
membership been at least partly funded by public 
means. States have a multifaceted interest in the 
internet functioning at its best, and wear many hats 
to this end. One is legislative, another regulatory, 
but also another facilitating an environment 
for incentive, innovation and economic growth. 
However, states also have a hat branded with 
providing a functioning and fair justice system for 
their citizens. The trick is to fit this with the other 
– and maintain a balance so that they all stay put.
I. Intermediary99 liability
35 Following legal uncertainties with respect to 
liability and responsibilities of intermediaries, 
legislative means were taken on both sides of the 
Atlantic. In the US a legal framework established 
with the Communications Decency Act and the 
Digital Millennium Copyright Act, describes that 
intermediaries will not be held accountable for 
user generated material on their sites unless they 
were notified of the material being a copyright 
infringement or a criminal act and did not have 
in place an effective notice and takedown system 
to relieve an infringement.100 With respect to 
defamatory content, the same does not apply as 
section 230 of the Communications Decency Act 
states: “The Act provides that no provider or user 
of an interactive computer service shall be treated as 
need to be revised.
98 <http://www.osce.org/secretariat/190571>.
99 Intermediaries are key players in a functioning internet. 
They are internet service providers (ISPs), service providers 
(such as mailbox service, website hosting, cloud services) 
and transit providers.
100 World Intermediary Liability Map. The Center for Internet 
and Society. Stanford University.
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the publisher or speaker of any information provided 
by another information content provider. No cause 
of action may be brought and no liability may be 
imposed under any State or local law.”101 Similarly, 
the EU adopted the e-Commerce directive102 that has 
been transposed in domestic legislation within the 
Single Market in a fairly uniform manner making 
intermediaries who run a merely technical operation 
not liable for third party content and describes a 
notice and takedown system to be in place regarding 
“illegal activities” but in line with freedom of 
expression as protected under Article 10 in the 
ECHR. While the directive prohibits member states 
from imposing a monitoring obligation of a general 
nature on intermediaries, the ECJ has found that 
the liability exemptions under the directive do not 
preclude states from enacting legislation entailing 
civil liability for defamation for online news outlets. 
The Court stated that:
“The limitations of civil liability specified in Articles 12 to 14 
of Directive 2000/31 do not apply to the case of a newspaper 
publishing company which operates a website on which the 
online version of a newspaper is posted, that company being, 
moreover, remunerated by income generated by commercial 
advertisements posted on that website, since it has knowledge 
of the information posted and exercises control over that 
information, whether or not access to that website is free of 
charge.”103
36 These findings were cited in a recent judgement 
from the ECHR in the Delfi vs. Estonia case, when the 
Grand Chamber of the Court upheld the findings of 
the Estonian Supreme Court, stating that the internet 
news outlet Delfi could be held liable on civil grounds 
for a defamatory comment posted on the site by a 
third party. The Court did not base the findings on 
the e-Commerce directive, as the Estonian Supreme 
Courts found the relevant domestic legislation 
transposing the E-Commerce directive inapplicable 
and based its findings on the company’s breach of 
the Obligations Act.104
37 Both the cases concerned the civil liability of a private 
entity operating in a wider capacity than merely 
technical, meaning that they could be held liable 
for defamatory material generated by third party. Up 
until recently most states applied defamation clauses 
in cases of revenge porn. In light of the findings of 
the above mentioned cases from the ECJ and ECHR it 
is interesting that case law from European countries 
101 Ibid.
102 Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 8 June 2000 on certain legal aspects of information 
society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the 
Internal Market (‘Directive on electronic commerce’) OJ L 
178, 17.7.2000, p. 1–16.
103 C-291/13. Papasavvas. ECJ. 11. September 2014.
104 Delfi v. Estonia. GC of 16 June 2015. (Application no. 64569/09).
does not indicate that service providers have been 
challenged to bear liability in revenge porn cases. 
That may also suggest that most of the providers 
in question do not operate under the jurisdiction of 
European states, but rather US states, freeing them 
from possible liability for third party content that 
may be in breach of defamation clauses. Further, it 
remains to be seen what effect the criminalization 
of revenge porn will have with respect to possible 
liability of intermediaries in such cases.
II. Providing information 
on the disseminator
38 Online anonymity and the use of pseudonyms can be 
immensely valuable for individuals and underlying 
societal, democratic, or economic interests. This can 
be the case for people that disseminate information 
with an intent to expose corruption or violations. 
The posting of revenge porn has no such grander 
goals.
39 The acquisition of essential information in order 
to establish responsibility in revenge porn cases 
is reliant on cooperation with private entities that 
control the information in connection with their 
operations. Swedish police report that they have 
found an effective way to cooperate with some 
major social media platforms, while others are not 
as willing to cooperate.105 Requests from European 
police forces in cases of revenge porn are both based 
on criminal charges and breach of civil code within 
their jurisdiction. This entails that the charges are 
based on a legal framework formed and enactment 
under legal and societal orders that in general are 
democratic and are a part of the European Convention 
System. It is somewhat paradoxical to claim that 
states that are subject to an effective human 
rights monitoring system would demand that the 
companies interfere with information contrary to 
human rights. Yet cases show that the companies are 
often faced with a complex situation as not all states 
are based on a democratic order, and democratic 
states have put forth unbalanced requests for 
information about individuals to companies.106 
Recent revelations show that some states engage in 
invasive practices in cyberspace in the interest of 
anti-terrorism without what seems to be a proper 
105 The report states also that recently the National Police 
Commissioner has following consultation with Facebook 
and Instagram gained access to the essential information. 
Brottsforebyggande Radet. Polisanmälda brott hot och 
kränkningar mot enskilda personer via internet. Rapport 2015:6. 
2015. P. 90.
106 The Case of the Icelandic PM Birgitta Jonsdottir is 
summarized in a resolution of the International 
Parliamentary Union PU Governing Council. 189th session. Bern, 
19 October 2011. <http://www.ipu.org/hr-e/189/is01.htm>.
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balance to human rights.107 Further, the companies 
that hold information due to their operations that 
are based within US jurisdiction are not altogether 
bound by the same legal framework, even though 
some also operate partly under EU legislation.
III. Removal of revenge porn 
from the online sphere
40 It has proven problematic to have revenge porn 
content removed from the internet.108 In cases where 
the victim is the author of the material, such as in 
the cases of nude “selfies”,109 the victim could claim 
copyright over the content and thus oblige website 
operators to delete the content on those grounds. 
Such action will only apply to the website in question 
so the content might still be accessible on other 
platforms. Cases also show that victims can seek 
redress from those responsible for the publishing 
and dissemination of the content on tort grounds 
such as defamation and distress.110
41 Some companies have built efforts against revenge 
porn into their terms and conditions. Google 
issues and updates its Transparency Report111 with 
information on requests the company receives from 
governments, copyright owners, and individuals 
that want their information removed from Google’s 
search results.112 In June 2015 Google revealed that 
revenge porn will also be removed from search 
results upon request stating that:
“[…] revenge porn images are intensely personal and 
emotionally damaging, and serve only to degrade the 
victims—predominantly women. So going forward, we’ll 
honor requests from people to remove nude or sexually 
explicit images shared without their consent from Google 
Search results. This is a narrow and limited policy, similar 
to how we treat removal requests for other highly sensitive 
personal information, such as bank account numbers and 
signatures, that may surface in our search results.”113
107 The Snowden revelations. See for example: <http://www.
theguardian.com/us-news/edward-snowden>.
108 See Chapter 5 in Citron, D.K. Hate Crimes in Cyberspace. 
2014. Harvard University Press. Cambridge, Massachusetts. 
P. 120 – 141.
109 A photograph that one has taken of oneself, typically one taken 
with a smartphone or webcam and shared via social media. 
<http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/
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42 The efforts by Google are likely to limit the harm 
caused by revenge porn, but they will not remove 
the content from the relevant websites, social media 
platforms or forums where originally posted and 
thus they would be subject to further distribution 
online.
F. Summary
43 The legal framework on revenge porn has developed 
fast in the last years. Despite states claiming that 
revenge porn was regulated under the general 
legislation, amendments have been made to penal 
codes in a number of nation states and US States 
specifically criminalizing what is described as 
revenge porn. The legal framework up until now 
has proven very complex to enforce, with the 
recent regional criminalization still to be put to the 
efficiency test.  Information from European police 
forces highlight that challenges of efficiency remain 
in order for the justice system to sufficiently protect 
victims of revenge porn.
44 Private entities play a crucial role in the functioning 
of the internet. With the leverage provided for 
intermediaries with the current legal framework on 
both sides of the Atlantic, terms and conditions and 
internal rules of private entities seem to trump legal 
orders of sovereign states that are formed within a 
democratic system framed by human rights. This 
poses a challenge to the state obligations under the 
ECHR in light of the theory of the responsibility of 
states to protect. With the notice and takedown 
procedures already awarded to copyright protected 
material under US and EU legislation, the technical 
procedures for companies to take down revenge porn 
material are available. In the current regime it can 
be claimed that the protection of the human rights 
of victims of revenge porn remains a challenge with 
respect to states’ responsibilities due to jurisdictional 
challenges posed by the borderless nature of the 
internet. In order to uphold their duties, a cross 
jurisdictional effort of states in cooperation with 
private entities would have to take place. Otherwise 
there will continue to be two different streams of 
legislation and technology with victims of revenge 
porn stuck in the middle without any chance of 
crossing either. That is a situation that does not align 
with the human rights obligations of states.
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